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RECENT DEVELOPMENT 
EVANS V. STATE: SECTION 142 OF THE MARYLAND 
PUBLIC SAFETY ARTICLE OF THE MARYLAND CODE DID 
NOT CONTAIN A PENALTY PROVISION NOR A RELATED 
PENAL TY; THEREFORE, THE ACT OF OBLITERATING, 
REMOVING, OR ALTERING A MANUFACTURER'S 
IDENTIFICATION MARK OR SERIAL NUMBER ON A 
FIREARM WAS NOT A CRIME. 
By: James Robinson 
The Court of Appeals of Maryland held that no crime exists when a 
criminal statute lacks an internal or corresponding penalty provision. 
Evans v. State, 420 Md. 391,23 A.3d 223 (2011). Specifically, the court 
held that because the statute prohibiting the removal of a firearm's 
identification mark or number contained no internal or related penalty 
provision, due to legislative oversight, it did not constitute a crime. Id. at 
414,23 A.3d at 236. 
In 2007, Leroy Evans, Jr. ("Evans") was indicted on eleven drug and 
firearm counts in the Circuit Court for Prince George's County. Count 
Nine of the indictment charged Evans with violating section 5-142 of the 
Public Safety Article of the Maryland Code, which prohibited the 
"obliteration, removal, change, or alteration of a manufacture's 
identification mark or number on a firearm." A jury convicted Evans on 
Count Nine and the court sentenced him to five years incarceration, 
running consecutively to the sentence for another count. 
Evans appealed his five-year sentence for Count Nine to the Court of 
Special Appeals of Maryland. He argued that the trial court erred in 
imposing a punishment for his violation of section 5-142 of the Public 
Safety Article. However, the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland 
affirmed the trial court's conviction and sentence, holding that Evans' 
removal of the serial number from the handgun amounted to illegal 
possession of a regulated firearm and that a five-year prison term was 
justified under the penalty provision in section 5-143(b) of the Public 
Safety Article. In response, Evans filed a petition for a writ of certiorari 
to the Court of Appeals of Maryland. The writ was granted to determine 
whether his conviction under section 5-142 and his sentence under 
section 5-143(b) were proper. 
The Court of Appeals of Maryland began its analysis by emphasizing 
that generally, criminal statutes must contain language that bans specific 
behavior and prescribes a penalty for the prohibited act. Evans, 420 Md. 
at 397, 23 A.3d at 226. Without an assigned penalty, the forbidden 
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conduct is not a crime. Id. at 397-98,23 A.3d at 226 (citing WAYNE R. 
LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW § 1.2(d), at 12 (5th ed. 2010». The court based 
their reasoning on the basic principle that a criminal statute should be 
reasonably explicit in order to put an ordinary person on notice of the 
prohibited conduct and penalty for such behavior. Evans, 420 Md. at 
398, 23 A.3d at 226 (citing Gargliano v. State, 334 Md. 428, 445 n.16, 
639 A.2d 675,638 n.16 (1994». 
Although typically located within the criminal statute, the court 
acknowledged that the lack of an internal penalty provision does not 
necessarily inhibit a statute's ability to criminalize conduct. Evans, 420 
Md. at 398-99, 23 A.3d at 226-27. The court identified situations where a 
criminal statute may reference another statute for punishment or refer to a 
separate catch-all statute, to ensure that a person is punished in a 
prescribed way. Id. ( citing LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW § 1.2( d), at 12-13). 
Additionally, a statute may classify behavior as a misdemeanor or felony 
with another statute, indicating the permissible punishment for each 
classification. Evans, 420 Md. at 398-99,23 A.3d at 227. 
The court also cited a previous case in which the penalty provision for 
the forbidden conduct of possessing unstamped cigarettes was located 
under a different title of the Tax-General Article. Evans, 420 Md. at 399, 
23 A.3d at 227 (citing Chen v. State, 370 Md. 99, 803 A.2d 518 (2002». 
The court held that the two sections, despite their different locations 
within the Maryland Article, could be read in pari materia so that the 
penalty provision was applicable to the statutory provision. Evans, 420 
Md. at 399, 23 A.3d at 227 (citing Chen, 370 Md. at 110, 803 A.2d at 
524). 
Similarly, the State argued that the penalty provision found in section 
5-143 is linked to the prohibited conduct proscribed by section 5-142. 
Evans, 420 Md. at 405-06, 23 A.3d at 230-31. In addressing this 
assertion, the court relied on principles for statutory interpretation. Id. at 
400, 23 A.3d at 228 (citing Ray v. State, 410 Md. 384, 978 A.2d 736 
(2009». According to these principles, the court first considered the 
plain language of the statute giving meaning to each word, sentence, and 
clause. Evans, 420 Md. at 400, 23 A.3d at 228 (citing Ray, 410 Md. at 
404-05, 978 A.2d at 747-48). When the language is still ambiguous, the 
court then looks to the legislative history, intent, and overall statutory 
scheme. Evans, 420 Md. at 400-01,23 A.3d at 228 (citing Ray, 410 Md. 
at 404-05, 978 A.2d at 747-48). 
Applying these principles, the court first compared the language that 
described the forbidden conduct in section 5-142(a) to the language in 
section 5-143(a). Evans, 420 Md. at 401-02, 23 A.3d at 228-29. The 
court observed that section 5-142(a) prohibited the removal or 
obliteration of the manufacturer's identification mark or number, while 
section 5-143(a) addressed the specific actions of "illegal sale, rental, 
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transfer, purchase, possession, or receipt." Id. at 405, 23 A.3d at 230. 
According to the court, which cited Black's Law Dictionary and 
Merriam-Webster's Collegiate Dictionary, the actions listed in the two 
statutes are not synonymous. Id. at 405, 23 A.3d at 230-31. 
The court also focused on the fact that the two statutes varied in their 
basic applicability. Evans, 420 Md. at 401-02, 23 A.3d at 228-29. 
Specifically, section 5-142 referred to "firearm" while section 5-143(b) 
referred to "regulated firearms," a much narrower class of firearms, 
which excludes shotguns and rifles. /d. The court found this distinction 
meaningful and pointed out that the legislature could have easily 
remedied the inconsistency as it had with other statutes. Id. at 404, 23 
A.3d at 230. 
Considering the State's argument that the legislative history of 
sections 5-142 and 5-143 promoted a reconciliation of the two provisions, 
the court expanded its focus on the actions of the legislature. Evans, 420 
Md. at 406, 23 A.3d at 231. A thorough recitation of the legislative 
history of the two statutes revealed that section 5-142's statutory 
predecessors always contained an internal penalty or explicitly referenced 
the penalty provision of another statute. /d. at 406-13,23 A.3d at 231-35. 
However, in its 2003 effort to recodify sections of the Public Safety 
Article and assign each statute an internal penalty provision, the 
legislature unintentionally omitted the penalizing language from section 
5-142. Id. at 411-12,23 A.3d at 234-35. 
The court ultimately rejected the State's arguments and determined 
that the absence of an internal penalty provision and the legislature's 
failure to amend the term "firearm" to "regulated firearm," revealed that 
section 5-142 was accidentally "orphaned" from a penalty provision. 
Evans, 420 Md. at 413-14, 23 AJd at 235-36. Although the error was 
clearly a legislative oversight, the court stated that it could not add or 
correct the language. Id. at 414, 23 A.3d at 236 (citing Graves v. State, 
364 Md. 329, 772 A.2d 1225 (2001». As such, the court held that section 
5-142 did not constitute a crime and accordingly reversed the conviction 
and vacated the sentence as to Count Nine. Evans, 420 Md. at 414, 23 
A.3d at 236. 
Applying strict statutory interpretation consistent with the basic 
principles of criminal law, Evans held that a person must be on notice as 
to specific prohibited conduct and its accompanying penalty, otherwise 
there is no crime. This holding also reinforces the separation of powers 
principle. Although the court recognized that the absent penalty 
provision was a result of legislative oversight, it was unwilling to correct 
the mistake because doing so would equate to lawmaking, a power 
reserved to the legislature. Evans places defense attorneys on notice that 
clients may have been convicted and sentenced for non-criminal conduct 
if they committed the act of obliterating, removing, or altering the serial 
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number on a firearm during the time when there was not a prescribed 
penalty. Finally, prosecutors and judges should be aware that charging 
defendants with this offense is improper and until the legislature remedies 
the error, dismissal of the charge is the appropriate recourse. 
